Report
Koraput: A Belt of Developing Peasant Struggle
Based on the review of our poll performance in the recent Lok Sabha elections, Party Central Committee commented "Outside Bihar, the best performance has been in Koraput (Orissa)." Perhaps such a result was not expected by many comrades of the party, not to speak of understanding the very dynamics of this particular development. It will be in place to dis-cuss the background and the future prospect of our work in Koraput — one of the most backward regions of our country.
The background
Tribal dominated Koraput in southern Orissa bordering Andhra Pradesh (AP) is known for its abject poverty and backwardness. It came into lime-light in the 70s and became politically sensitive with its association with the Srikakulam armed peasant struggle inspired by Naxalbari peasant strug-gle. Actually, part of the districts of Ganjam and Koraput in Orissa and Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh emerged as the epicentre of a viable peasant upsurge based on the downtrodden and most backward Girijan or tribal peo-ple. Agriculture in these parts is very backward and very little irrigation exists. There is cruel exploitation by the landlords alongwith money-lenders. The people are largely dependent on forest economy and this gives plenty of space for the middlemen to loot and plunder forest produces. A large number of tribal lands are transferred into the hands of non-tribal exploiters through dubious means. Srikakulam district of AP encircled by Ganjam and Koraput districts of Orissa, is mainly divided into the coastal region (dominated by production of commercial crops like cashew and coconut) and ‘agency’ areas (relatively hilly and having more forests).
This entire region transformed into a wide belt of militant peasant struggle with this backdrop. However, due to lack of experience and inbuilt tactical weaknesses, this struggle could not sustain for a long period. Within few years the movement had to face a serious debacle in face of severe repression and bourgeois ideological offensive. But the Srikakulam-Koraput belt of the peasant struggle contributed much in setting a new tradition of self-sacrifice and dedication. Hundreds of leaders and cadres embraced martyrdom rather than surrender and thousands more were put in jail.
New phase of reorganisation
The first serious attempt at reorganising the revolutionary wave in this region could only begin in the early ’80s. Of course, the attempts at re-peating the old experiment of Srikakulam was all along carried out by different revolutionary factions inspite of not getting any meaningful results. Our attempt at reorganising the movement could also include this region only after Com.Nagbhushan Patnaik joined our Party after coming out of jail in severe ill-health. This particular had its own implication beyond mere organisational or technical link. Not only is Com.Patnaik one of the seniormost revolutionary leader but he also personifies the link between the old revolutionary struggle of the Srikakulam-Koraput belt and the present phase of reorganisation.
The process of reorganisation was initiated through the campaign of reviving our links in the old areas of struggle with particular emphasis on interaction with activists and cadres who were maintaining their activities in different ways. The next step in the process was to initiate some mass movements based on poor peasants particularly of tribal background on the question of land (seizing illegally occupied land), wage (on securing minimum wages) etc.
Meanwhile our experiment to advance mass political action through IPF was also introduced in this region. It was initiated to enhance wider interaction and expanding our base.
In this way we could develop our work in the pockets of old Ganjam, Koraput and Srikakulam. But still we could not make a breakthrough on the question of party building particularly on developing a network of party structures at different levels based on local cadres and activists from among the poor peasantry. Obviously it created a dependence on a few lead-ers of the Party. Moreover, our observations on the new developments of this region were as follows:
After the setback of our movement, the ruling class planned a new set of reforms for this particular region. Of course, these reforms were in accor-dance with the overall reforms of the Indian ruling class represented by Indira Gandhi. These reforms were implemented more vigorously in Srikakulam as compared to other districts of Orissa. Compared to Srikakulam, the socio-economic situation of Koraput still remains similar to the situation of the ’60s. On the other hand Koraput has a bigger political vacuum. The political space is largely covered by the Congress based on its traditional influence among the tribals due mainly to the strong network of the tribal chieftains. Comparatively, the political space in Srikakulam is more limited. In addition to Congress and TDP, almost all factions of communist revolutionaries exist there.
| Famine and drought in
Koraput-Bolangir-Kalahandi Good Drought Brings The three undivided districts of Kalahandi, Bolangir and Koraput consti-tute the most backward region of Orissa and perhaps even India. Today the three districts have been reconstituted into 8 new districts, namely, Koraput, Rayagada, Naupada, Malkangiri, Kalahandi, Nabrangpur, Bolangir and Sonepur. This entire region has been prone to drought and famine since 1897 despite the history that since 1919 to 1947, the average development rate (with respect to forest produce, agricultural production, per capita income etc.) of this area was more than 5% per annum. Based on a petition to the Rajya Sabha by a local resident of the region and signed by an MP representing the region, regarding improper use of funds meant for poverty alleviation programmes leading to starvation deaths in the region, a committee on petitions was constituted to investigate into the matter. In a report submitted in March this year, the committee has come out with some significant findings. It is quite ironical that even though the region has good water resources (3 multi-purpose irrigation projects, abundantly available ground water at low depths, river network etc.) yet since 1985 drought conditions have been declared in the district. Some districts, particularly Kalahandi are surplus in food grains (one fourth of Orissa Government’s foodgrain pro-curement comes from these districts) yet there is starvation. A door-to-door survey carried out by the state government in 1992-93 found 78% of the families in the region live below the poverty level (though the Lakdawala Committee findings based on a projection pegged it at 48%). However, the findings of the present committee estimated the poverty line at around 90%! About 300 people in Kalahandi alone have succumbed to starvation deaths in 1996-97. Some in the forested Langagarh and TH Rampur block of the district ‘roam in the jungles and eat whatever vegetation they get from the jungles. Sometimes they also eat poisonous vegetation resulting in their deaths.’ An earlier National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) team investigat-ing into 21 cases of starvation deaths in the region, while citing the reasons said that there were extensive crop damages, malnourishment, inade-quate income levels and insufficient out reach of relief measures. In many cases, especially among the old and infirmed, death occurred due to pro-longed malnutrition due to near absence of relief measures. The report also mentioned that regarding Public Distribution System (PDS) the team received abundant complaints of non-availability of foodgrains and leakage to the black-market. In some places ration cards were distributed for the first time ever just the day before the investiga-tors arrived. The state government has been implementing the Targeted PDS in this region. However, the enumeration of the poor based on the methodology adopted by the Central government has taken only 40.56% below the poverty level and not 78% as found by the state survey. This has left more than 11 lakh families outside the TDPS. The Centre has also reduced the TDPS allocation for Orissa due to lower estimates of the poverty line. The committee felt this as an important factor behind aggravating the problem of starvation. Almost all implementation and monitoring of relief work was in the hands of the government agencies and the local administration. However, based on a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed against the Orissa government in 1987 by Indian People’s Front and in 1985 by veteran Gandhian, Kishen Patnaik, the Supreme Court ordered the state government to include members of recognised voluntary organisations in the District Level Natural Calami-ties Committee (DLNCC). However, the heavily bureaucratised committee is largely inactive as noted by the NHRC team. The committee found that under the state government’s ban on movement of agricultural produces across districts a situation has been created in this region where prices are not remunerative compared to neighbouring districts and often farmers are rounded up for ‘smuggling’. On the other hand, the food corporations haven’t intervened positively in supporting higher prices taking the special case of a region devastated by natural calamity. The committee notes that the corrupt nexus of private traders and government officials often depress market prices and farmers are often forced to make distress sale. At many places, the committee also notes, state and central purchasing agencies are absent. The most important reason revealed by the Committee’s report for the artificially-created famine and drought condition is the rampant corruption that manifests at all levels of the official machinery in collusion with private contractors. In Kalahandi, Rs.16 lakhs meant for Employment As-surance Schemes were diverted to the purchase of luxury goods for the local administrative officers and their staff. In this regard, the state govern-ment feigned ignorance to the Committee and failed to furnish some specific information. In many cases the government has failed to submit the audit reports and utilisation certificates in time. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has also pointed out diversions and even misappropriations in various programmes in these areas. For example, CAG has found that for the financial year ending 31 March 1995, Rs.18.13 lakhs of Area Development Approach for Poverty Termination (ADAPT) funds were diverted while many wells dug for providing precious drinking water were abandoned midway. Similarly, for the next financial year the CAG found that ‘the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Divisions procured materials far in excess of re-quirement, many of these diversions failed to salvage materials valued at Rs.7.98 crores and 16,559 tubewells were declared defunct, expenditure of Rs.18.08 crores incurred on 5,650 tubewells was rendered unfruitful as the water contained excessive iron, fluoride and chloride,...’ Almost 60% of the region’s population is comprised of SCs, STs and other weaker sections. The report notes at various places that the SCs and the STs are the hardest hit. A Krishak Kalyan Yojana (KKY) under which tube-wells are financed through a mix of subsidy and loan, often has no takers from among SCs and STs since beneficiaries have to contribute Rs.15,000 which is often impossible. Bank credits in this regard have a very poor record and even the National SC/ST Finance Corporation is nowhere in the scene. The Banking Division of the Ministry of Finance and NABARD have also detected numerous cases of fraud and misappropriation of development funds like IRDP by the public sector banks. Further, according to the committee’s findings the cases detected by Banking Division/NABARD is just a tip of the iceberg of what seems to be a massive racket thriving on drought and famine relief funds. With rampant malpractice and cumbersome processes in the public sector banks, numerous private sector banks have proliferated in the region and are almost fleecing the poor people. In fact, in all aspects of administration and development, the report’s assessment has been negative and very critical almost to the point of confessing that no development work ever takes place at least without massive swindling of funds. Quite rightly, a news item quoted in the report admits that corrupt officials, local influential people and private contractors, all love a good drought! |
With these observations and experiences we tried to develop our work in the next phase after the 5th Party Congress. In this phase our emphasis was more organised work on the basis of the following tasks:
1) Party building, particularly developing Party structures, local activ-ists and cadres and providing party education.
2) Developing mass movement in a more planned way.
3) Politicising the peasant struggle.
Actually this process was concentrated in some blocks of the newly formed Gajapati and Rayagada districts. (Old Ganjam district has been reorganised into the districts of Ganjam and Gajapati and old Koraput district has been reorganised into Rayagada, Koraput, Nabrangpur and Mal-kangiri) Our new efforts gradually yielded results. We could develop a batch of Party activists and cadres from among the tribal people. Regular system of recruiting Party members and organising them in different struc-tures has been established. Attempts were also made to recruit some party members from among non-tribal middle strata. A few political training camps were also organised and district level party structure was also formed.
Successful land seizure struggle was organised in some pockets. Mass resistance against repression by police-mafia nexus and legal battles were combined with this land struggle. Anti-liquor movement against the liquor mafia and notorious landlords were also organised. Com.Nirmala Ganapati, a peasant activist, was killed in the movement and a broad mass resistance was organised against the killing.
Anti- government and administration political campaign was combined with pocket-wise peasant struggle at state and district level. Depending on the mass base gained through peasant movements, we also participated in Panchayat elections and elections for 2 assembly segments (Gunupur and Parlakhimindi) and Koraput parliamentary seat. Though our electoral gains were marginal, we could organise and attract political campaign to popularise our political trend and banner.
Meanwhile PWG squads tried to intensify their efforts to expand their influence in our areas of work in Orissa. They indulged in some senseless actions along with their fund collection drive through terror. This invited state repression in this region. We emphasised on educating our base and demarcated with the PWG by organising more mass movements to cope up with the anarchists. The PWG, which operates mainly from the bordering terrain and mountains, has failed to win over our social base and consolidate its roots in this area.
The main weakness in this phase has been our failure to expand our area of influence inspite of favourable objective factors. In this backdrop, we decided to co-ordinate our activities in this region. To start with, we selected four districts viz. Gajapati, Rayagada, Kalahandi (Orissa) and adjacent Srikakulam. Our aim was to bring this region under a unified plan, exploring for veteran cadres (who are continuing their work since the 70s), fully developing a new contingent of cadres and activists, striving for shaping a more wide area of peasant struggle and finally ensuring some more effective gains in political struggle through winning at least a few MLA seats from the region. But we were faced with a parliamentary election this February itself. We co-ordinated efforts to concentrate our contest in Koraput Lok Sabha seat. Our direction of planning was to concentrate in Gunupur assembly segment; exploring and politicising our new forces from TU background in Rayagada proper so as to expand our influence in the Rayagada assembly segment; to develop some primary network in Bisan Cuttack assembly segment particularly in bordering pockets of Kalahandi; expanding our influence in Kashinagar assembly segment through our friends in other groups and organising an effective and attractive political campaign in the other 3 assembly segments (Patangi, Koraput and Jaypur).
| ‘Encounter’ Killing of PWG Women Police killed four women fighter of PWG on 13 April 1998 early in the morning in Karnigoda village (under Ramnagoda block of Raigada district). They were members of the armed unit of PWG. One of them, Com.Poranna, was 50 years old and belonged to the village Bodopader of Srikakulam district - the historical village which gave birth to great martyrs like Panchadev, Nirmala Ganapati, Subba Rao Panigrahi etc. She was actively involved in politics since 1969 and in the process of ups and downs she joined PWG three years back. On a tip-off from local sources a huge posse of policemen from AP trooped into this village in Orissa without informing the latter. The women had gathered in the village for a meeting. The police fired point blank at the hapless women and later called it an encounter killing. Few other PWG women and men were injured but managed to escape. Our Party has condemned the cold-blooded killing in the name of encount-er and appealed to the people to undertake the path of militant mass move-ment and resistance to solve their burning problems instead of adopting an anarchist path as advocated by PWG. |
In spite of a resource crunch during campaigning we were more or less, able to go by our plan and were successful in getting over 15,000 votes from the Koraput seat. Assembly-wise break-up of these seats are Gunupur - 5,251; Bisan Cuttack - 1,045; Rayagada - 2,793; Larchimpur - 1,655; Patangi - 1,836; Koraput - 1,395; and Jaypur - 1,048. This has created a widespread enthusiasm among our ranks. But leaving no room for complacency we have ever since the elections, taken the lessons learnt from the polls among our ranks. We have emphasised that poll results show that Koraput has ample objective space for revolutionary forces. In the coming days Koraput can emerge as the nucleus of the peasant struggle.
-D.P.Buxi