ARTICLE

When Success Becomes a Burden

– Arindam Sen

Nothing succeeds like success, they say. But there are occasions when too much of it carries the ill omen of a systems failure that might not be far away. Such seems to be the case with the Left Front Government (LFG) in West Bengal .

The LF's victory in the recent assembly elections was a foregone conclusion; the scale of the landslide was not. The bourgeois media and captains of industry led by Ratan Tata went euphoric in heaping praises on Chief Minister Buddhadev Bhattacharya (BB); thinking sections of the CPI(M) cadre at various levels did not . Experience and intuition gave them a hunch that the going was not really as good as it looked. The Front had scored even better in 1982 and 1987 (in 1987 it won 251 seats compared to 235 this time) but it is the shifting support bases and voter perceptions that caused the consternation: nearly 10% loss in agrarian labour vote and approximately 18% gain in three categories -- higher professionals and businessmen, urban salaried, and rural salaried. Was the extensive support of the rich and upwardly mobile classes, they wondered, an unmixed blessing? Are we not neglecting and alienating the poor, our traditional vote bank? How far and how long can we carry on like this?

Some of such inchoate apprehensions now find a cogent expression in an article by Prabhat Patnaik (PP): "Left in Government" ( Frontline , May 20 -- June 2, 2006 ). "Euphoria over the Left's victory", warns PP, "must not obscure the fact that whether in West Bengal or in Kerala, it has some very stiff tasks ahead of it, in the context of the current neoliberal dispensation, which it still does not have the political strength to roll back." The article makes interesting reading as one of the first serious attempts, from within the parliamentary Left camp, to identify the growing social contradictions that threaten the Left governments and of course, to find potential solutions.

Running with the Hare and Hunting with the Hounds

Basically, PP makes four points in presenting his version of the problem, which has also been commented upon by other analysts:

1. “The peasantry and agricultural labourers … constitute the solid rural base of the Left ... In addition, an urban middle class support base” (the reference is mainly to the affluent section that demands shopping malls and bypass roads for their cars -- see below) “has developed of late. There is a certain tension between these two support bases which the Left will have to face in the coming years, but the results of the present elections are so overwhelmingly favourable … because it is placed in that happy transitional period when it can get the support of both these segments.”

In sum, you cannot expect to go on enjoying simultaneous support of both the poorer and the upwardly mobile sections; the clash of interests between the two is bound to surface before long. Right, Mr. Patnaik, in fact the conflicts are already making themselves felt. And your basic apprehension is fully corroborated by the post-poll survey report of the CSDS, which says, inter alia :

"This election showed the first signs of a major shift … from the 'old Left' support base of the rural poor and urban working classes to that of the 'new Left' support among the rural well-to-do and the urban middle and upper classes... most impressive gains come from the professional salaried classes.... In the rural areas the Left has suffered most serious losses among the agricultural and allied workers, barely maintained its position among the farmers and tenants and made massive gains among the rural salaried class.... the Left seems to have contained its losses among its old fort while gaining new social groups. But this move towards a 'catch all' party is likely to strain the Left's core votes in the future elections."

Let us return to Patnaik.

2. “The urban middle class in West Bengal, like elsewhere in the country, has come off rather better than other strata from the neoliberal era,” (this is only natural, for the LFG follows exactly the same set of neo-liberal policies) “and would assertively demand the fulfilment of its aspirations.

Such fulfilment, however, is likely to impinge adversely on the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the rural poor. Its demand for shopping malls could ruin petty traders. Its demand for infrastructure like roads and bypasses, necessary in view of the growing number of cars, could entail encroachment on agricultural land (and also, PP could very well add, eviction of hawkers, demolition of roadside stalls etc.). And its demand for housing complexes and amusement parks could lead to dispossession of the peasantry. In densely populated West Bengal , "land-for-land" compensation would be difficult to organise, and "cash-for-land" is a poor substitute, apart from its adverse effect on agricultural production and employment.”

Well, these are precisely the points we have been making for quite some time, particularly in

course of the debate on the proposed transfer of prime agricultural land to Indonesia 's Salim group. Very recently the controversy has picked up again, with the government bent on handing over triple-cropped land in Singur (not far from Kolkata) to Tata Motors.

3.In the context of "the fiscal squeeze” by the Centre, “if it” (the West Bengal government) “is to maintain some decent level of social expenditure, it will have two obvious courses to choose from: one is to turn to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the DFID, or such like agencies, which in the long run … would entail compromising its basic principled positions; the other is to use the available fiscal space for raising more revenue which would have to come from the urban middle classes. The overall neoliberal dispensation in the country thus forces a sharpening of the contradiction between the urban middle classes and the basic classes of the Left (peasants and workers).”

Surely PP is not unaware of the fact that the WB government has already opted for the first choice, and very presumptuously at that. Is this why he sounds the caveat about "compromising its basic principled positions"?

4. “The Left's victory in Kerala can be attributed to the anger at this contrast” (between "collapse of incomes because of … falling prices of export crops” and "certain islands of affluence") ... It is inter alia a response to the agrarian crisis.”

The ugly contrast mentioned here, PP would agree, is a necessary corollary of the neo-liberal economic policies and a major cause of the fall of the Kerala government as well as the Naidu government in Andhra and the Vajpayee government at the centre. But of late it is visibly growing in WB too, which is indeed inevitable so long as the state follows the same model of 'development'. Agriculture is also not doing as well as it used to do a few years ago, even if one cannot speak of a crisis as yet.

Where do we get then? Accelerated social polarisation, with the overwhelming mass of working people sinking deeper into absolute or relative poverty and a handful soaring to the skies, is an inexorable law of neoliberal capitalism. This makes it next to impossible for any party including the CPI(M) to pretend to represent and care for both poles. The CSDS presented the problem in the following words:

"... this electoral victory poses a long-term challenge to the CPI(M). Can it retain its old social base among the rural poor … as it moves aggressively to court the industrialists and investors? This is particularly important as the Left voters do not seem to be very enthusiastic about the liberalisation agenda, if the CSDS post-poll survey is anything to go by."

The CPI(M) thus finds itself between the horns of a dilemma: should it run with the hare, or hunt with the hounds? The conflict is quite palpable at lower levels. To take just one example, in the first week of June this year a housing complex project in Barakhola mouja near Eastern Metropolitan Bypass under the Chief Minister's assembly constituency (Jadavpur, Kolkata) had to be put on hold on account of resistance on the part of local CPI(M) leaders. We have all along helped all the development projects, they said, but no more apartments for the rich in our area, please. We have had enough of them. Business concerns do profit from such projects, but not the poor people. So let there be some projects for direct pro-people development, such as water supply works, on these lands.

Localised resistances like this do not usually last long, but they do point to a growing social conflict in urban and rural Bengal . It is to this that PP has drawn attention. And, as usual, he has also come up with a wonderfully naïve solution.

Searching for "A Possible Way Out"

"In any system, especially in a neoliberal one, there is always a certain "slack", in the form of unutilised industrial capacity, unsold foodgrain stocks, unadopted innovations…. This "slack" can be used to keep under control the contradictions that may emerge between the urban middle class and the basic classes of the Left. …For instance, the Employment Guarantee Scheme, for which the resources would come largely from the Centre, if implemented vigorously and scrupulously in the Left-ruled States, would provide succour to the rural poor, enlarge the rural market for simple goods and services, and hence carry forward the Left agenda. "

PP's formulation of "left agenda" is indeed revealing. But we will resist the temptation of going into this and concentrate on his practical suggestions.

The problem with the employment guarantee scheme is that it is operational in only a third of the total number of districts, as the author is well aware. The state government is of course free to run it in the remaining districts also, but where is the political will and/or economic resources required for that? Even in the districts earmarked for the scheme, it is either limping under the burden of bureaucratism, partisan nepotism and other evils, or not moving at all, as is the case in many other states. PP, however, believes that "the Left presence in Parliament can be used to pressurise the Central government to enact legislation for relief to the poor. And the scrupulous implementation of such legislation in the Left-ruled States would enable the Left to keep faith with the people without exacerbating the contradictions between the different segments of its actual or potential support base.”

Getting the Centre to serve the old loyal rural poor constituency while using the State government increasingly for catering to the urban and rural affluent constituencies -- could there be a better instance of pragmatic eclecticism? Unfortunately, the UPA government does not seem to be too eager to act under Left pressure of persuasion -- not even after the recent Left victories in WB and Kerala. The government's tough stand on hikes in petrol prices is enough indication of that.

But our well-meaning economist is determined to find an easy way out. At the end of the article he therefore calls on the Left to “search out the "slack" in our economy, which can play the same role that oil prices have played in sustaining the Venezuelan revolution”. The question is, does India possess a resource comparable to Venezuelan oil? Even if it did, how would the Left, with their presence limited to three State governments, use that for the welfare of the masses? Will Sonia and Manmohan follow the advice of Karat and Bardhan to tread the path of Hugo Chavez? Will they, in other words, face up to the might of US imperialism to initiate a process of pro-people, independent development of the national economy?

Absurd, isn't it? The learned Professor has in his command a vast array of facts but, a prisoner of a social democratic thought process, cannot search out the truth and therefore has to fall back on utopian ideas and exercises in self-deception. In this particular instance he lands himself in trouble because he is searching for solutions to problems generated by the neo-liberal regime within the neo-liberal system itself. However, the problem is not his or his party's alone. The view that it is well-nigh impossible to transgress the bounds of the neo-liberal system (let alone smash it) and therefore one must try and build whatever resistance one can, or work for whatever good things one wishes to, from within the system -- this view has become quite fashionable in a large section of left intellectuals who find themselves helpless in the face of powerful onslaughts of neo-liberalism. That such an effort gets us nowhere, however, PP's article demonstrates once again.

Expanding Space for the Revolutionary Left

The "way out" suggested by PP may prove to be a blind alley, but that is not too important. What is significant is that he has honestly identified the growing social conflict that has the potential of destabilising the government credited to be the most stable in India . Not unexpectedly, he gives us only a partial account of the problem; it remains for us to restore it to actual dimensions and draw correct conclusions.

The expansion of the CPI(M)'s social base among the urban and rural rich and middle classes at the cost of erosion in the traditional worker peasant base has not yet hurt the party in terms of seats won. Rather, it has scored impressive gains compared to the last few elections. Yet there are at least two reasons why many in the party feel rather perturbed. One, obviously it would not be possible to satisfy the endless aspirations of the new rich in perpetuity and there is every possibility of a future shift in their votes. If in the meantime the stable vote bank of the poor also gets frittered away, that would bring the curtains down on the gala show that is the source of all power and glory. It is as simple as that.

Two, the main ruling party's political control over large sections of workers and peasants, which constitutes its USP (unique selling point) to attract massive inflow of indigenous and foreign investment, maybe in jeopardy. Wiser by experiences gained in Gurgaon, Kalinganagar and Jagadishpur, (in Orissa, where peasants staged a road blockade movement to resist land acquisitions by steel giant Posco) as well as in rebellious Latin America, corporate biggies have developed a special liking for governments capable of exercising a hegemonic influence to restrain peasants and workers, to deflect the latter's anger and anguish (towards, say, the very convenient ‘US imperialism') so that industrialisation, urbanisation and 'development' can proceed smoothly. It is this capacity that makes the CPI(M) Chief Minister in Bengal , like the Workers' Party (PT) president of Brazil , an international favourite of predatory big capital. Once the CPI(M) loses this capacity, the USP of "Brand Buddha" will be gone, leading to the collapse of the development model itself.

It is apprehensions like these that prompt the more mature sections of the CPI(M) leadership to try and impart a sobering effect to the overhasty, overambitious, and often embarrassingly crude wooing of big capital by the CM. Of course, they are doing this from within a framework of full political support to the path basically treaded by BB in accordance with the party line. The leaders also take particular care to ensure the internal struggle, even though it reflects only a partial opposition aimed at correcting or moderating some of the more reckless steps, does not come out into the open, but at times it does. One quick look at a couple of most recent examples when senior CPI(M) leaders unwittingly, or maybe deliberately, expressed their growing feeling of unease with the present scheme of things may serve to give us an idea of what is going on.

In the wake of the peasant protest at Singur – angry peasants had gheraoed officials of Tata Motors during a land inspection tour arranged by the State government - state secretary Biman Bose came up with a very caustic comment during a televised press conference: "the media hype about the so-called ‘Brand Buddha' is nothing but a ploy to finish him off." He also blamed the electronic media for provoking or plotting the protest. This outburst clearly reflected the disgruntlement of an important section within the party over the break-neck speed with which BB and his principal aide, Industries Minister Nirupam Sen, were running along the reform road. What however attracted everybody's attention was the acerbic remark made by Jyoti Basu (JB) following the Singur incident. The senior-most leader did not try to hide his disgust when he criticised the government before the electronic media for rushing through such matters without sufficient political and administrative preparations. He was particularly wary of the fact that the party and the Kisan Sabha were not properly taken into confidence. Go ahead but don't run too fast, he seemed to warn his successor, and don't take the peasants for granted.

A careful and sustained endeavour is thus going on within the CPI(M) and the LF to protect the old social equation, which had paid off so handsomely in the past, from the stresses and strains of neo-liberal reforms. Typically, the resistance emerges from below, gets reflected at the upper echelons of the party hierarchy, and then leads to some modifications (of the original plans) or damage control measures. This was witnessed last year in the outbursts of land and land revenue Minister Rezzak Mollah against the proposed transfer of 5100 acres of agricultural land to the Salim group, which generated a large-scale debate that forced BB to beat a (tactical and partial) retreat. The Singur incident too had its echo in the Left-led peasant organisations and succeeded in shaking the top just a little bit. The ‘pro-investment' government was then compelled to come up with a more ‘liberal compensation package' for the aggrieved peasants. This did not solve the problem, though, but that is beside the purview of our present discussion.

Actively involved in this inner-party struggle aimed at saving the structure of class collaboration, so assiduously built up under JB's stewardship, is the grand old man of CPI(M) himself and JB-loyalists within the LF ministry. Another old friend of the LF who is most fiercely critical of all this, is ex-finance minister of Ashok Mitra (see box for his observations). Patnaik's is an important theoretical contribution to this overall, and in a sense collective, endeavour.

All these stalwarts, however, are fighting only a losing battle. There is absolutely no question of the CPI(M) or the LF giving up the parliamentary path and the reform road; nobody within or in the vicinity of the Front is demanding that. So, by the very operation of inexorable economic laws, the rich-poor hiatus is and will be growing. Class contradictions are and will be getting intensified. And, in proportion, social space for the forces of class struggle is and will be expanding. In these elections our party and a few other communist revolutionary organisations did receive, compared to earlier occasions, much greater response from the rural poor and other sections of toiling masses like tea garden workers; and to an extent this was translated into votes, too. What the situation now demands of us is more persistent and painstaking work and energetic initiative to fully utilise the enhanced scope in the arena of mass movements.